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Abstract 
Research has produced mixed findings about the impact of participation in employee share 
ownership (ESO) schemes on employee attitudes and behaviours. Analyses of how participants 
themselves interpret ESO’s effects could contribute to both theory-building and empirical 
evidence, but have not, to date, been undertaken. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 
37 participants in three tax-advantaged ESO schemes in nine companies within the United 
Kingdom. Employees tended to feel that ESO had not increased their motivation, commitment or 
performance because they were already exhibiting these at a high level, as any good employee 
should. Even where this occurred, there was little evidence that employees thought ESO had 
strong effects, with the exception of staying with the company long enough to get a financial 
payoff. For some, this payoff was far from certain to materialise. There was some evidence that 
ESO was perceived to lead to a greater general sense of inclusion and that feeling special (e.g. 
being selected to participate) enhanced the perceived effects of ESO. We highlight the important 
roles of expectancy and instrumentality (expectancy theory) and conclude that the employee 
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experience of ESO reflects theory in some respects, but also offers new elements that theory may 
need to incorporate. 
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Introduction 
Employee share ownership (ESO) is a form of employee financial participation designed to 
encourage employees to acquire shares in the company in which they work (Pendleton, 2010), and 
to give them the right to share in the wealth of that company (Landau et al., 2007). ESO’s capacity 
to influence employee attitudes and behaviours, and in turn affect individual and firm 
performance, has been a key reason why policy-makers support ESO (see Kaarsemaker, Pendleton 
and Poutsma, 2009). Some ESO studies, especially early ones, have investigated effects following 
an employee buyout, where the firm is completely employee-owned. In contrast, many others 
focus on firms where ESO provides employees with relatively fewer shares as part of a benefits 
package and the total percentage of the company owned by employees is significantly smaller 
(Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2009). Expectations and experiences of what it means to 
be an employee owner may differ significantly between these cases. This study focuses on three 
different HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) approved (tax-advantaged) share 
schemes in the UK. This includes two all-employee schemes (where all-employees and directors 
must be invited to participate), the SAYE (Save as you Earn, also known as ShareSave) and SIP 
(Share Incentive plan). The third, EMI (Enterprise Management Incentives) is a discretionary 
scheme. In this scheme, companies can choose which employees they would like to participate. 
Each is briefly described in Appendix 11.  
Overall, research has shown that simply participating in ESO or giving employees 
ownership in the company does not automatically change employees’ attitudes or behaviours 
(Authors, 2016; Kruse 2002; Landau et al., 2007; McCarthy, Reeves and Turner, 2010; Pendleton, 
2001; Sengupta, Whitfield and McNabb, 2007). In relation to employee commitment, a number 
of positive findings (e.g. Long, 1978a; Pendleton, Wilson and Wright, 1998; Tucker, Nock and 
Toscano, 1989) contrast with those suggesting little or no impact (e.g. French and Rosenstein, 
1984; Kruse, 1984; Long, 1982). For employee satisfaction, some studies suggest ESO can 
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improve employees’ job satisfaction (Long, 1978a; Long, 1978b; Long, 1982; Buchko, 1992) and 
some do not (e.g. Hammer, Stern and Gurdon, 1982; Keef, 1998). With regards to ESO and 
motivation, Freeman (2007) observes that studies tend to find (slightly) higher levels of motivation 
in employee-owned firms. Overall, the ESO research literature reports neutral to positive findings 
when exploring ESO’s attitudinal effects. The same is true of studies of ESO’s effects on 
individual and firm performance (Bryson and Freeman, 2010; Guedri and Hollandts, 2008; Kruse 
2002). Furthermore, where effects on attitudes or behaviour are reported, they can rarely be 
described as major (Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2010; Knyght et al., 2010; Landau et 
al., 2007; McCarthy, Reeves and Turner, 2010; Pendleton, 2001; Sengupta, Whitfield and 
McNabb, 2007).  
In earlier work, using the same dataset, we (Authors, 2016) explored the role of 
psychological ownership (PO) in some depth. The aim was to develop understanding of how 
employees interpret and make sense of the relationship between PO and ESO schemes, and 
whether employees felt that ESO had led to changes in PO or the routes proposed to lead to PO 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991). The study examined the role (or not) of PO in ESO 
participants’ explanations of any changes in their attitudes or behaviours. We found that PO 
played little or no part in employees’ explanations of how the ESO scheme impacted upon their 
attitudes or behaviours. Having explored the (non) role of PO in some depth, in this paper we 
therefore use other data from the same people to offer a broad-ranging analysis of how employees 
perceived and explained the impact (or not) of ESO on their attitudes and behaviours, and how 
the effects can be explained.  
Although people do not necessarily have conscious awareness of the causal processes that 
affect them (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), this study aims to inductively explore which elements of 
theory are most salient to ESO participants. The findings make an important contribution to the 
research literature, raising questions about the significance of claims that ESO enhances positive 
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attitudes at work. Our findings contrast with a number of studies, including Jones and Kato (1995), 
Blasi, Kruse and Markowitz (2010) and Sesil et al. (2002) where performance effects were found 
or inferred. This study contributes understanding of how ESO’s impact on employee attitudes 
(including employee commitment, motivation and job satisfaction) and behaviours can be 
explained (when found), and why claims about the impact of ESO are unlikely to ring true to most 
ESO participants in UK tax-advantaged schemes. We find support for a small number of studies 
suggesting that it is important to take pre-existing attitudes and behaviours into account when 
introducing ESO schemes, and when evaluating the impact of ESO (Caramelli and Briole, 2007; 
Pendleton, 2010; Pierce et al. 1991). We note how respondents’ accounts of ESO’s effects (and 
lack thereof) were often closely aligned with the assumptions and components of expectancy 
(VIE) theory (Vroom, 1964). In order for ESO to have an effect, our findings infer that ESO 
schemes can be used to communicate to employees how important and valued they are to the 
company, whilst giving a clear indication of how employees can make money from the scheme in 
a way that meets their expectations.  
The following sections present a review of the research literature, the methodology, a 
discussion of themes found in the data, and conclusions. This is followed by limitations and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
Literature Review  
Caramelli (2011, p. 9) argues that there is a lack of consistency in how ESO has been defined, the 
use of independent and dependent variables, and that more theoretical development is needed 
regarding the links between variables. Caramelli’s general point is well taken, but nevertheless a 
number of theoretical perspectives have been developed which attempt to explain what effects 
ESO can be expected to have, and in what circumstances. This is important because ESO takes a 
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wide variety of forms and names (Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2010), and it would 
therefore be surprising if it had uniform effects.  
In our previous work, we (Authors, 2016) reviewed the links between ESO and the 
routes to PO; the attitudinal and behavioural effects of PO; and the role PO may play in explaining 
ESO’s effects. In the following review, we focus on ESO (rather than PO) and present evidence 
from several different fields of research. First, we present findings and theories from labour 
economics and industrial relations, including principal-agent and gift exchange theories. These 
perspectives tend to focus on employee behaviour and performance at the firm level. We then 
address studies of organizational behaviour and work psychology, where the focus moves more 
towards individual level examinations of employee attitudes, and concepts such as employee 
motivation and job satisfaction. In the following sections we present key themes from these 
different fields of study, and identify some of the likely explanations for ESO’s attitudinal and 
behavioural effects.  
 
Industrial relations and labour economics  
Alignment of interests  
In economic theories of ESO (e.g. Blasi, Conte and Kruse, 1996; Sesil et al., 2002), aligning the 
interests of principals (employers/ managers) and agents (employees) is suggested to be a benefit 
of ESO, which incentivises employees and managers to work towards common goals. Employees 
may perceive only a weak connection between individual effort and reward, if for example the 
organization is large or if organizational performance and share value are seen largely as a 
function of economic factors outside the organization’s control (Blasi, Conte and Kruse, 1996). 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that where links between individual effort and reward are 
plausible, employees do tend to be more productive (or at least work harder) and sometimes 
monitor the behaviour of co-workers to make sure they do too (Freeman, Kruse and Blasi, 2010). 
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In some forms of employee ownership, the employee has a lot of personal money invested in the 
organization, and the risks can be high (Markowitz, Blasi and Kruse, 2010).  Expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964) suggests that employees will make an assessment of whether their actions are 
likely to achieve identifiable outcomes. In line with expectancy and instrumentality theories of 
motivation (Vroom, 1964), as long as some connection is perceived between personal 
performance and personal financial outcomes, we might expect that the higher an employee’s 
financial dependence on ESO the greater the behavioural effects are likely to be (Long, 1982). 
However, this proposition has obtained mixed support. In a review of the literature, Freeman 
(2007) observed that a strong link between size of stake and motivation has not been convincingly 
demonstrated.  
Within the field of industrial relations, a number of studies have examined the impact 
of ESO on firm performance, again producing mixed results (Blasi et al., 1996; Ben-Ner and 
Jones, 1995; Robinson and Wilson, 2006). Guedri and Hollandts (2008) explored possible reasons 
for this inconsistency. The longitudinal data, collected from 230 French firms, revealed an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between employee ownership and accounting-based measures of 
performance. Up to a certain point, ESO’s impact on performance was positive, after which, the 
marginal effect of ESO then became negative (Guedri and Hollandts, 2008). In their discussion of 
the findings, Guedri and Hollandts (2008) postulate that ESO’s impact on firm performance will 
rely on positive changes in employees’ attitudes, including their motivation, job involvement and 
satisfaction. These attitudinal changes will have a direct effect on productivity, according to 
Guedri and Hollandts (2008). Richter and Schrader (2016) also test the impact of ESO on three 
alternative measures of firm performance in companies from the five largest European economies. 
They conclude that over time ESO levels exert few performance effects. The marginal effects of 
ESO are found to decline as ESO levels increase. These studies, as with a number of others (e.g. 
Blasi et al., 1996; Kruse, 1996), raise questions about how the low (and mixed) effects of ESO 
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can be explained, and the psychological mechanisms underlying the behavioural impact. We 
explore this in the present study.  
  
Gift exchange theory 
Drawing on Akerlof (1982), some studies in the field of labour economics have discussed how 
ESO might be seen as a gift from the organization which encourages employees to give something 
back (gift exchange), typically in the form of harder work but also possibly longer tenure and a 
greater felt loyalty to the employing organization (Bryson and Freeman, 2014). In ESO schemes 
employees buy shares at discounted rates, and/or are given shares or share options.  The ‘gift’, in 
the context of ESO, is likely to refer to the opportunity to participate and be a share-owner, the 
reduced or pre-determined discount that is offered, or the award of free or matching shares. There 
is some suggestion that the reciprocation is more pronounced for weaker-performing employees 
who may believe they are being given something more than they have earned, whereas top 
performing employees conclude that they deserve it (Baron, 2013).  However, the impact of a 
‘gift’ of shares may be substantial even amongst high performers if it is interpreted as signalling 
that they are especially deserving or valuable to the organization (Caramelli, 2011), for example, 
when the shares are offered only to selected employees.  Here the impact of ESO may be based 
less on gift exchange and more on personal self-esteem or even self-aggrandisement. Our study 
will allow us to explore these possible interpretations and reactions of employees to ESO.  
 
Employee participation 
In addition to gift exchange theory, it has frequently been suggested that ESO works best when it 
is just one manifestation of a larger package of measures aimed at promoting employee 
involvement and voice (Dube and Freeman, 2010; Pendleton and Robinson, 2010). At one level, 
simply owning shares often allows a form of participation, namely voting at the organization’s 
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AGM. However, the shares owned by any individual are very unlikely to make a material 
difference to any such votes. Freeman (2007) argues that satisfaction and motivation derive from 
increased participation, as opposed to size of ownership stake, or ownership per se. This is 
consistent with long-standing streams of research in both industrial relations (Pendleton, 2001) 
and organizational psychology (Kelly and Clegg, 1982) which have shown how participation in 
decision-making often has positive effects, likely through a combination of feeling valued and 
having more autonomy and control at work than might otherwise be the case. A number of studies 
in organizational behaviour (e.g. Klein, 1987; Klein and Hall, 1988) have examined if, and how, 
ESO’s participation and control rights affect the satisfaction, motivation and commitment of 
employees.  
 
Studies of organizational behaviour 
In the field of organizational behaviour, ESO has been studied extensively. Credited as ‘a 
landmark study’ (Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2010, p. 325), ‘influential on both the 
subsequent US and the UK literature’ (Landau et al., 2007, p. 11), Klein (1987) proposed three 
different models of ESO. First, Klein’s intrinsic satisfaction model suggested that the simple fact 
of ownership increases employees’ commitment to, and satisfaction with, the company. This 
model was not supported in Klein’s (1987) own findings, which suggested that intervening 
variables may be needed. The subsequent inconsistencies noted above in the labour economics 
and industrial relations fields about the effects of ESO support that conclusion.  
The remaining two models presented by Klein (1987) provide deeper explanations of the 
mechanisms underlying ESO’s inconsistent effects on the attitudes and behaviours of participants. 
Klein’s instrumental model proposed that ESO increases employee influence in company decision 
making, which then impacts on employee commitment. Despite some early negative findings (e.g. 
French and Rosenstein, 1984), employee participation in decision-making and having an influence 
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at work have remained popular explanations of ESO’s impact (see Pendleton and Robinson, 
2010). However, the suggestion that employee participation in decision making is needed in order 
for ESO to have a positive impact, is questionable. In the industrial relations literature, the 
inflection point of the inverted U-shaped relationship between ESO and firm performance found 
in Guedri and Hollandts’ (2008) study was not dependent upon the level of employee 
representation on the board. In the field of organizational psychology, participation in decision 
making has been theorised to lead to a feeling of control and influence, and a sense of PO over 
the ‘controlled’ object (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991). In the case of ESO, it is proposed 
that additional control rights will provide employees with a stronger sense that this is ‘my’ or ‘our’ 
organization, and consequently think, feel and behave more positively (Pierce et al. 1991). 
However, there is little empirical evidence to support this. McCarthy and Palcic’s (2012, p. 3710) 
study, based on the data sourced from annual reports of Eircom, Ireland’s former national 
telecommunications operator, and [Authors’] (2016) qualitative UK study, both fail to find 
evidence that participants perceived any effect of ESO on their attitudes or behaviours via feelings 
of PO.   
A small number of studies suggest that an important consideration to make when 
evaluating employees’ reactions to ESO, is the expectations they have when participating in the 
scheme (Caramelli and Briole, 2007; Pendleton, 2010; Pierce et al. 1991). This is because it is 
thought that ownership is likely to increase the expectancy perceptions of employees (Long, 
1978b). Few studies have examined the links between ESO and employee expectations, or the 
ways employees think about and value the outcomes of their ESO participation. Expectancy theory 
would suggest that employees' judgements about the effectiveness of the ESO scheme, satisfaction 
and other attitudinal and behavioural changes, will depend on the employees’ expectations and 
perceptions of the ESO scheme (Pendleton, 2010). Pendleton (2010) notes that these perceptions 
and expectations can also influence employees’ decisions to participate in the scheme. The 
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findings of some studies suggest that ownership can lead to positive attitudinal and behavioural 
outcomes, depending on what is expected and whether the individual values the outcomes. For 
example, Barba-Sánchez and Atienza-Sahuquillo (2017) found that the valence of business 
ownership predicted a person’s motivation to remain self-employed. In another study, using 
expectancy theory, Hsu, Shinnar and Powell (2014) reported that individuals were motivated to 
become business owners when they felt that their effort would result in the desired goals (e.g. 
independence, social status etc.). However, few studies have applied expectancy theory when 
exploring ESO’s psychological impact.  
 
Financial rewards  
Klein’s third model, known as the extrinsic satisfaction model, depends on ESO being financially 
rewarding. Klein’s (1987) findings suggested that the size of the company contribution to ESO 
was significantly positively related to organizational commitment, and significantly negatively 
related to turnover intention. A number of studies have since found support for this model (e.g. 
Buchko, 1992; Dewe, Dunn and Richardson, 1988) but as we note below, the effects of ESO via 
extrinsic satisfaction may be limited. Klein’s extrinsic satisfaction model has clear resonance with 
economic thinking about ESO, though the link between personal effort and rewards is not essential 
to it – the more financial reward an employee gets through ESO, by whatever means, the more 
satisfied he or she is.  
Similar explanations have appeared elsewhere in the literature. The ‘golden handcuffs’ 
explanation refers to how employee investments in ESO lead them to stay in the organization until 
a return can be realised, which due to ESO scheme rules and/or economic conditions may take a 
considerable and possibly uncertain amount of time. In a UK study, Sengupta, Whitfield and 
McNabb (2007) found lower levels of affective commitment in workplaces with ESO, which is 
consistent with an undermining of intrinsic motivation. Instead, continuance commitment – ‘the 
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perceived costs associated with leaving the organization’ (Meyer and Allen, 2002, p. 21) - helped 
to explain ESO’s positive association with labour productivity and financial performance.  
However, some studies have suggested that employees with an investment expectation 
(sometimes called financial orientation) to ESO are unlikely to become infused in the 
organization, thus limiting ESO’s potential to change their attitudes and behaviours. For these 
employees, Pierce et al. (1991, p. 130) explain that they will expect the value of their ownership 
stake to rise, and will feel they have a right to profits. Some motivation theory (Deci and Ryan, 
1980) proposes that the obvious presence of extrinsic rewards serves to undermine the effects of 
intrinsic rewards. In their analysis of data from 37 companies with ESO, Klein and Hall (1988, p. 
637) argue that employees are more satisfied with ESO when the contribution made by the 
company to the scheme is large, and when more money is made. However, Klein and Hall’s (1988) 
empirical work reveals that whilst financial rewards are important, other factors also affect the 
satisfaction of employees. Klein and Hall (1988, p. 630) found that the characteristics of the ESO 
scheme contributed to employees’ satisfaction with the scheme. Characteristics included the 
presence of voting rights, management's employee ownership philosophy (measured using three 
items, including ‘employee ownership is a central part of our management philosophy’), 
communications (measured by counting the number of communications strategies the company 
used to communicate information about the ESO scheme), company contributions to the scheme, 
and the age of the scheme (Klein and Hall, 1988, p. 632). In addition, employee status within the 
scheme, employee values, interactions between employee and scheme characteristics, and 
employees' general attitude toward the organization as a whole (organizational commitment) were 
also found to affect employee satisfaction (Klein and Hall, 1988, p. 630). It is possible that the 
various ESO related characteristics mentioned cause employees to feel satisfied with the ESO 
scheme. However, it is also possible that the ESO scheme attracts employees who are more likely 
to be satisfied with the characteristics of the ESO scheme. The scheme may not necessarily be 
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effective at attracting employees who have lower levels of job satisfaction, or those with lower 
levels of motivation. Klein and Hall’s (1988) study provides little insight into how attractive these 
ESO characteristics are to non-participants, or ESO’s capacity to improve attitudes. It is also 
unclear whether enhanced satisfaction with the ESO scheme relates to job satisfaction, other 
attitudes such as employees commitment, or performance behaviours.  
 
Shared understanding  
Finally, we find in our review of organizational behaviour literature that the shared understanding 
employees have with managers may make a difference. As with some of the other studies 
mentioned in the field of organizational behaviour / psychology, Rousseau and Shperling (2003) 
draw on theories presented by economists (discussed earlier in ‘principals and agents’) which 
suggest that the alignment of interests between employees and managers will lead to more 
productive work behaviour. Rousseau and Shperling (2003, p. 561) argue that this is dependent 
upon ‘a shared understanding regarding the psychological contract’. Mutual understanding will, 
according to Rousseau and Shperling (2003), influence how employees interpret and satisfy the 
psychological contract they have with their manager. In contrast to economic literature which 
suggests that employees are likely to violate the terms of an agreement unless deterrents are in 
place (i.e. punishments), Rousseau and Shperling (2003, p. 561), observe that in organizational 
psychology, the assumption tends to be that employees will remain motivated and committed to 
psychological contract agreements (without a need for sanctions or deterrents) if they are well 
understood. They also argue that a lack of information, poor communication and a lack of 
understanding can lead to behaviour that economists may refer to as ‘shirking’. To strengthen the 
‘alignment of interests’ between ESO participants and managers, it is argued that opportunities to 
develop a shared understanding are therefore needed.  
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Summary 
The ESO literature has presented mixed findings about its attitudinal and behavioural effects, and 
these connections are still elusive and poorly understood. Nevertheless, the various theories and 
empirical work offer a number of suggestions about how and when ESO will have such effects. 
We do not make hypotheses or aim to test objective relationships between variables, but we can 
identify factors which appear likely to affect ESO’s impact as identified by employees’ lived 
experiences of being ESO participants. These include whether employees believe and expect that 
their own actions can influence how financially rewarding it is, whether it is perceived as a gift 
from the employer, whether it is available to everyone or only to a chosen few, how much the 
person has invested in ESO, what the financial returns are likely to be and how soon they can be 
obtained, and whether ESO is part of a wider range of participative measures, or at least perceived 
to signal a participative culture. These factors are likely to vary significantly between ESO 
schemes, organizations and individual employees (Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2010; 
Poutsma, Kalmi and Pendleton, 2006; Sengupta, Pendleton and Whitfield, 2010).  
Although several of the explanations of ESO effects described above invoke employee 
beliefs and perceptions, very few ESO studies investigate these directly. The vast majority of ESO 
studies exploring employee attitudes and behaviours have relied on large scale surveys, often 
focusing heavily on early models of ESO’s impact (e.g. Klein, 1987). It has been recognised that 
qualitative research would provide deeper insights into the processes described and sometimes 
tested in previous research (Knyght et al., 2010; Sengupta, Pendleton and Whitfield, 2010). As 
yet, only a small number of ESO studies have taken non-positivist, or mixed method approaches. 
Of those that have, Jackson and Morgan (2011) used interviews to discuss with UK employees 
their reasons for participating (or not) in Sharesave schemes. They found that it was largely seen 
as a means of saving for those who already intended to stay with their organization. Maaløe (1998) 
applied qualitative techniques and a phenomenological emphasis in order to chart cultural and 
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change-management processes in an organization that switched to employee ownership. More 
recently, using different parts of the dataset reported here, [Authors] (2016) examined 
participants’ explanations of how they feel their sense of PO is affected by participating in a 
company ESO scheme, finding little evidence of any link. 
There is therefore a lack of published qualitative evidence which could help develop 
understanding and uncover the nuances of how employees experience the effects of ESO. We 
examine how UK employees, in three different schemes and nine different companies, make sense 
of ESO. We phenomenologically explore how they feel ESO has affected (or not) their 
commitment, satisfaction, motivation, job tenure intentions and performance at work - effects 
most often proposed in socio-psychological explanations of ESO.  
 
Method  
The ESO schemes 
In the UK there are currently four different HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) 
approved (tax-advantaged) share schemes. These are SAYE (Save as you Earn, also known as 
ShareSave), SIP (Share Incentive plan), CSOP (Company Share Option plan) and EMI (Enterprise 
Management Incentives).  SAYE and SIP are all-employee schemes (where all-employees and 
directors must be invited to participate) whilst EMI and CSOP are discretionary schemes where 
companies can choose which employees they would like to participate. In this study we focus on 
SIP, EMI and SAYE, each of which is briefly described in Appendix 1.  
 
Sample and procedure 
The sampling approach taken in this study was ‘non-probability’, the purpose of which is to 
identify people who may have information about the process being studied, as opposed to seeking 
a random or representative sample (Hornby and Symon, 1994). Although our intention was not to 
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claim the findings to be representative of a larger population, we wanted the design of the study 
to permit comparisons between what was felt to be important by employees in different 
environments. We therefore sought three companies using each ESO scheme. We tried also to 
ensure that within each scheme there was variety in company sector and size, and that within each 
company there was variety in employee characteristics such as length of service and income. As 
Table 1 shows, we were fairly successful in these aims, though all three SAYE companies were 
very large. Table 1 describes the study respondents and companies included in this study and in 
Authors (2016), in which we explore participants’ explanations of how they feel their sense of PO 
is affected by participating in a company ESO scheme. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
In order to attract interest in the study, ESO scheme administrators in the UK agreed to 
forward letters summarising the study to ESO managers in their client companies. We also 
publicised the study at relevant conferences. Consequently companies contacted us directly if they 
were interested in being involved. We then provided further information with regards to number 
of interviews, time commitment and the type of questions that would be asked. We also briefed 
the ESO manager about ethical and data protection standards that would govern the research. 
 The ESO managers of participating companies were provided with an information sheet 
and criteria which they could use to select four interviewees. They were asked, if possible, to seek 
variation in terms of seniority of the employee in the company, the amount of shares or options 
the employee owned in the plan, how long the employees had worked for the company and how 
long they had been participating in the ESO plan.  
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Thirty-seven semi-structured interviews with ESO participants of the SIP, EMI and SAYE 
schemes took place in nine companies in various UK locations. Prior to each interview, 
participants were given an information sheet explaining the project and their rights as participants. 
They also signed a consent form. The interviews were conducted in a private room at the 
interviewee’s workplace and ranged in length from twenty five minutes to over one hour. 
Permission was granted by all participants for interviews to be audio recorded. Interviews were 
also conducted with an ESO manager in each company. For the purposes of this paper, these are 
used only to provide contextual information. Insights into manager expectations and additional 
contextual information about each company ESO scheme is provided in Appendix 2.  
Interviews were guided by a set of questions with follow up questions and probes to help 
ascertain details of how employees thought about ESO and how they explained their experiences. 
Interviews were semi-structured; flexibility was used when it helped to elicit employee 
perceptions about if, how, when and why participation in ESO had affected them. The interviews 
were structured in the following order, addressing a number of areas, including: the way 
employees felt about the company they work for, and their job; why they participated in the ESO 
scheme and their expectations; their experiences of and reactions to the features of ESO; the extent 
to which they felt the scheme met their expectations; perceived changes in their attitudes and 
behaviour as a result of ESO; and reflections on their attitudes towards the company and their job. 
Follow-up questions ensured that, if employees didn’t discuss them spontaneously, the potential 
effects of ESO on motivation, commitment, satisfaction, performance, and length of tenure were 
covered. 
 
Data analysis    
The analytical approach taken in this study most closely resembled a process of Thematic Analysis 
as described in Braun and Clarke (2006). This can be defined as a method for ‘identifying, 
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analysing and reporting patterns and themes considered important in relation to the overall 
research question’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Data coding is the process of organizing the 
material into chunks or segments of text before bringing meaning to it (Creswell, 2009, p. 186).  
The first author generated a draft set of codes which were discussed by all three authors, and 
a slightly revised set was produced.  The codes were developed following the identification of 
concepts and theories found in the literature (e.g. Klein’s three models of ESO), during data 
analysis, and from discussions and reflections on the data with co-authors. The first set of codes 
provided a way of organizing extracts and breaking down the transcripts for further analysis whilst 
maintaining focus on the aims of this study. Analysis was a recursive process, with movement 
back and forth (coding, re-coding, sub-coding), constantly re-evaluating extracts. Segments of 
coded text were then considered in more detail, segment by segment. During this process, codes 
were edited, new codes added, and overarching themes slowly emerged. In doing this, we 
highlight as closely as possible how employees interpret their experiences and the effects they feel 
arose from ESO participation.   
To enhance validity (Arksey, 1999) conceptual definitions were drawn from the literature 
and used both during discussions and analysis to help clarify and make sense of feelings 
interviewees described. These concerned, for example, affective commitment (Meyer and Allen, 
1984), continuance commitment and normative commitment (Allen and Meyer, 1990), 
organizational commitment (Porter et al., 1974), intrinsic motivation (Dysvik and Kuvaas, 2008), 
extrinsic motivation (Minbaeva, 2008), job satisfaction (VandeWalle, Van Dyne and Kostova, 
1995), performance (Kuvaas, 2006), in-role behaviour and extra-role behaviour (Mayhew et al., 
2007). Following the analysis, and after narrative had been added explaining the extracts and the 
links between them, we were satisfied that employees’ stories had been interpreted from the data 
and that their own accounts were reflected in the findings. 
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Findings  
In this section we begin by reporting data on how employees reported that ESO did or did not 
affect their attitudes and behaviour at work. We use a broad range of attitudes and behaviours that 
emerged in our data coding. In the discussion that follows we then examine participants’ 
comments and explanations regarding how they interpret the way ESO does or does not affect 
them, and discuss themes that help to inform our understanding and future theory-building about 
ESO. As we proceed, we will highlight where we see connections with, and illuminations of, other 
existing theory and research.  
 
Perceived effects of ESO on work attitudes and behaviours 
Instances of reported impact were minimal for most possible outcomes on all three schemes. 
Furthermore, analysis of participants’ interview responses showed that where an impact was 
reported, it was in most cases described as small or minor, especially regarding work attitudes.  
For example: 
 
 
….if there is a change, it’s pretty slight. I mean at the time [of joining the scheme] it was 
nice to feel part of something, rather than just an employee. So, you do feel a little bit more 
engaged. I can’t really explain much further than that to be honest. (EMI participant, 
Company 6).  
 
Very few respondents felt that participation in any of the ESO schemes had a discernible 
impact on their satisfaction, sense of belonging or other attitudes toward their organization. We 
also found that two employees from the 37 interviewed reported that ESO had some impact on 
their job performance. Within this rather sparse picture it is noticeable that EMI was the only 
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scheme to have virtually any reported effect on feeling trusted, feeling valued, feeling a sense of 
responsibility and work performance. Even for EMI, no more than a quarter of respondents 
reported any such effects. Even where they did, the perceived effects were uncertain and/or 
modest:  
 
I don’t think that just because I am a participant my productivity has shot right up, I don’t 
see that no. But, perhaps slightly. Not enough to say absolutely yes. (EMI Participant, 
Company 4). 
 
This finding about performance contrasts with a number of studies, including Jones and 
Kato (1995), Blasi, Kruse and Markowitz (2010) and Sesil et al. (2002) where performance effects 
were found or inferred. Of course, we are asking people for their perceptions rather than testing 
for causal connections between variables. This might explain the difference. Other possible 
explanations include already high levels of performance (i.e. a ceiling effect), or weak connections 
between perceptions of individual effort and reward (the ‘1/N problem’; Ben-Ner and Jones, 
1995). We will return to these themes shortly. 
Motivation fared just a little better, but still fewer than one in six respondents felt that ESO 
had made a difference. Almost a quarter of respondents, spread across all three ESO schemes, 
reported that ESO had some effect on their organizational commitment. By this we mean affective 
commitment (i.e. a sense of personal loyalty and identification with the organization), though 
some people expressing this also showed elements of continuance commitment - that is, being 
committed to staying for extrinsic reasons, most notably of course to reap financial benefits of 
ESO. For example: 
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I suppose it makes me marginally more committed because I have some investment there 
yes…I care about what happens to the company because if the company succeeds then I 
stand to not only you know progress my career and enjoy my job, but to make some extra 
money on the side. (SAYE participant, Company 9). 
 
Easily the most common outcome of ESO reported by our respondents was time spent in 
the company. This refers to expected tenure in the future, but it was sometimes accompanied by 
reasons why the participant had stayed until now. It was nearly always attributed to financial return 
(note also that both the previous two quotes refer to money, even though they are about motivation 
and commitment respectively). Nearly half the interviewees indicated that their future tenure with 
the company would be longer and/or more certain because of their participation in ESO. 
Employees considered a range of factors, including the opportunity to save money, tax savings, 
whether the scheme would produce a financial return and the attractiveness of the ESO scheme 
terms (e.g. the SIP matching rate, free shares, period of time before being able to exercise share 
options).  
 
…if I was to leave I would be giving up the (share) options. I think the fact that I am tied in 
to the share plan for five years makes me think that I hope I am going to be around for the 
five years. (SAYE Participant, Company 9).     
 
I think because of the terms of the plan, for example if you stay five years or more you are 
exempt from tax and NI (National Insurance), and if you are contributing quite a large 
amount, you could have quite a significant output to pay in tax if you left early. That plays 
a part in whether I will leave the company. (SIP Participant, Company 2).   
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I had seen colleagues of mine take out share save plans and make an absolute fortune, you 
know…so I thought I will stick with the shares for five years, and you know, I am bound to 
make some money. (SAYE Participant, Company 7). 
 
So with the important exception of continuance commitment (i.e. in this case staying due to 
money already invested in ESO and the expected or hoped for financial returns in the future), 
these findings suggest that claims that ESO enhances positive attitudes at work are unlikely to 
ring true to most ESO participants in UK tax-advantaged schemes. This is consistent with 
arguments that ESO alone is unlikely to induce changes in work attitudes and performance 
(Pendleton, 2001), and with Sengupta, Whitfield and McNabb’s (2007) ‘golden handcuffs’ 
account.                              
 
Themes  
How do employees explain these findings?  
The semi-structured interview design and the inductive analysis of the interview data provided an 
opportunity for unexpected themes to emerge. The analysis revealed that during the process of 
‘sense making’ (Cassell and Symon, 2011) employees examined and reflected upon their own 
ESO experiences, frequently making (direct and indirect) links to their expectations of ESO. In 
our interpretation and analysis of the data, we conclude that the majority of the explanations given 
to explain ESO’s perceived effects (or lack of them) can be linked to employees’ expectations of 
what could be achieved (expectancy); their assessment of whether their actions were likely to 
achieve identifiable outcomes (instrumentality); and the value they attributed to the potential and 
expected rewards of being an ESO participant (valence). In other words, after themes had been 
identified and discussed amongst authors, we found that they were closely aligned with the 
assumptions and components of expectancy (VIE) theory (Vroom, 1964). Our findings build on 
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the work of Long (1978a) and the theoretical work of Pierce et al. (1991, p. 133) in which it is 
stated that ‘expectancy theory provides one of several paradigms that can articulate a process 
through which employee ownership can produce a set of social-psychological and behavioural 
effects’. Caramelli and Briole’s (2007) theoretical work also provides similar assertions relating 
to the ways in which ESO could motivate employees to think and act differently at work. With 
regards to expectations, Caramelli and Briole (2007, p. 292) suggest that the effect of ESO on the 
employee will depend on the employee believing that their effort will lead to increases in their 
own, and the company’s performance. With regards to instrumentality, it is suggested that the 
employee needs also to believe that the increase in company performance will affect the value of 
company shares. Finally, in terms of valence, the increase in share value and financial returns 
must be meaningful and important to the employee. In Figure 1 we display the key themes 
identified in the data and what our interviewees said about them, which we interpret using the 
three components of expectancy theory.  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
Participation in company decision-making and processes 
Despite ESO helping some respondents feel part of the company, there was no evidence that this 
linked to participation as a result of ESO. Some participants did not know whether or not they 
were entitled to vote at company AGMs, and few showed much concern about it. Interestingly 
(and contrary to conventional wisdom) this study offers support for the proposition put forward 
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by French (1987, p. 427), that ESO participants will be more likely to expect a return on 
investment, rather than greater control or participation in decision making.  
 
There are voting rights, I got a letter in April, but I didn’t read it and that was something 
about voting, that is really bad isn’t it? I don’t know if I have them, it is not something that 
I am interested in. (SIP Participant, Company 3).   
 
…my vote now, because the shares are very much diluted…..would not have any impact. I 
don’t intend to vote at AGMs going forward. (SAYE participant, Company 9). 
 
This separation of ESO participation from workplace decision-making seemed to extend 
beyond voting at AGMs to more day to day interpersonal contexts. Some research (e.g. Bryson 
and Freeman, 2014; Caron, Ben Ayed and Vandenberghe, 2013) shows that supervisors and co-
workers are where the participative action is, but there was no evidence in our data that 
participation at this level was attributed to ESO:    
 
I have a very good manager who supports me and allows me to make my own decisions, so 
it [control at work] has not really changed I guess. (SIP participant, Company 2). 
 
Even in company 4, where ESO participants were something of a ‘chosen few’, only one 
respondent thought that greater participation might be an outcome, and even then it was tentatively 
expressed: 
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Perhaps subtly….my Directors, they probably know I have got shares so possibly their 
attitudes have changed, but yeah, it is nothing I can pinpoint, no. (EMI participant, Company 
4). 
 
According to Arnold and Randall et al. (2010, p. 320), in expectancy theory the instrumentality 
question isn’t worth asking if a person believes they are incapable of achieving the action or goal 
(expectancy). Employees did not appear to expect any additional control or participation rights in 
decision making from ESO participation, and did not feel they had received this. Therefore, it 
makes sense that they would feel incapable of being able to use any additional control or influence 
to improve firm performance. In terms of ‘instrumentality’, there was no evidence that employees 
felt that having additional influence would allow them to impact share price or company 
performance. Also, a lack of impact from ESO was not attributed by employees to a lack of 
participation in decision-making.  
 
Pre-existing attitudes and behaviours    
One reason frequently given for a perceived lack of effect of ESO across a number of potential 
outcomes was that positive work attitudes and behaviours were already being exhibited. The tone 
and wording of responses suggested that this was not simply a dispassionate logical point. Instead, 
it was a positive statement about the respondent’s own values and integrity:    
 
If £125 worth of shares was required for me to have those things then I should not be in my 
job in the first place. (SIP participant, Company 2).   
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I think the profile of people recruited here generally wants to do a good job…. Did any of 
us work less [before the ESO scheme] or were we any less committed to the business? No 
we weren’t. (EMI participant, Company 6). 
 
I never think, I am going to work a bit harder at this because I am a shareholder or in the 
Sharesave plan. I just think I will work as hard as I can on this because that is who I am. 
(SAYE participant, Company 8). 
 
These quotes are in contrast to some of the research literature, which suggests that ESO is 
associated with higher productivity (e.g. Bryson and Freeman, 2010), although it is acknowledged 
that causality is hard to demonstrate (Freeman, Blasi and Kruse, 2010). As noted earlier, our 
respondents may not have been aware of their psychological processes and thus may have reported 
inaccurately. Be that as it may, it seems that claims about the motivational and productivity effects 
of ESO are best kept at arms’ length from employees, who might be indignant to hear that their 
bosses believe their hard work and commitment can be bought by a share scheme. In relation to 
the expectancy and instrumentality components of expectancy theory, the majority of employees 
did not indicate during interviews that they expected ESO participation could, or would, lead to 
improved work attitudes, individual performance or share price. This may help to explain the lack 
of motivational impact we found in employees’ explanations of their ESO experiences.  
Richter and Schrader (2016) found an inconsistent relationship between ESO and the 
individual level performance measure, ‘sales per employee’, but found ESO had an impact on 
other capital market and value generation measures. In the present study, we find that employees 
felt ESO had little or no effect on their own work performance. It could be argued that ESO firms 
outperformed non-ESO firms (in Richter and Schrader, 2016) because better performing firms are 
more likely to offer ESO schemes to employees. By implication, employees in better performing 
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firms who are offered the opportunity to participate in ESO are likely to be performing relatively 
better than their counterparts in firms performing less well. This may be particularly true for firms 
with EMI schemes, where individuals are selected and invited to participate based on past 
performance. In other words, better performing firms may be more likely to introduce ESO 
schemes, and employees who are already performing well are more likely to have the opportunity 
to participate. In our findings it is possible that employees had ‘reached their peak’, and therefore 
did not feel they could work any harder. Responses suggested that this had occurred prior to 
joining the scheme. This could explain why ESO firms in Richter and Schraders’ (2016) study 
outperformed non-ESO firms, whilst individual level performance (sales per employee) was not 
enhanced drastically by ESO.   
 
Are the financial benefits of ESO worth staying for? 
Nearly half the respondents reported that ESO affected how long they planned to stay in the 
company. This was nearly always because of the expected or hoped-for financial payoff.  For 
these employees there appeared to be some belief (or hope) that the share price could rise and a 
return could be made. However, there was little evidence overall that ESO participants felt they 
could influence the financial return they hoped to receive (instrumentality). The reasons why not 
everyone reported that they would stay employed longer in the company because of ESO, give 
further insights into the experience of ESO. These revolve around (i) ESO being insignificant and 
forgettable, and (ii) ESO not being expected to make any money.  
Where ESO was regarded as insignificant and forgettable (e.g. “I just leave it, don’t think 
about it”), this was for one or both of two inter-connected reasons. First, the amount of money at 
stake was not seen as sufficient to affect work behaviour. Second, the plan was seen as too long 
term to think about. Examples of these opinions are: 
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I think of it as a long term plan, so I don’t think about it. What makes me remember it is 
when I receive the annual letter, I think, oh, I still have this plan. (EMI participant, Company 
5).   
 
I can see the benefits, but at the moment they seem so far off and so minimal, that, you 
know, like I say, the whole…it has been quite opaque right from the start and felt quite 
unclear. Nobody talks about it. (EMI participant, Company 6). 
 
Employees’ ‘out of sight, out of mind’ attitude to ESO is likely partly due to a perception 
that the longer the time interval, the more the danger that unexpected events will undermine the 
financial return on the plan. It also fits with utility models of value that discount benefits that are 
far in the future (Walther, 2010).  
Where ESO was not expected to make money, respondents gave two reasons why this might 
be the case. First, stock market volatility meant that shares or options purchased a few years earlier 
were worth less than had been paid for them, and might continue to be so for quite some time in 
the future.      
 
The share options, as I say, are worthless at this point in time, right now I should be more 
concentrated on maintaining or keeping my job. (SAYE participant, Company 9). 
 
Second, participants did not see a connection between what they did and the share price 
(instrumentality). This meant that whilst they might get a financial return, they might not and there 
was nothing they could do about it. An employee in Company 3 (SIP) explained that he and his 
colleagues felt there was a ‘disconnection’ between the employees’ efforts and the share price. 
Another respondent elaborated on this theme: 
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…..I don’t think there is any bearing on the share price of what I do. So I could do a 
spectacularly good job, and my Sharesave (SAYE) plans will still be worth nothing. So it 
really is luck. (SAYE participant, Company 7). 
 
These two reasons (a lack of expectancy and instrumentality) may help to explain why there 
was no discernible relationship between the amount of shares or share options held (where this 
was known by the respondent) and the perceived effects of ESO. Where the amount invested was 
discussed, it was more common for employees to say it would make no difference to them than 
that it would. Also, where respondents did feel the amount of shares owned would make a 
difference, they tended to invoke the pre-existing attitudes and behaviours theme, as if they did 
not want to appear easily swayed by money: 
 
No, it wouldn’t change anything. When I bought the first lot and the share value dropped 
significantly, so they were almost, you know, worthless, it didn’t really affect the way I felt. 
I just really wanted the company to turn around. (SIP participant, Company 2). 
 
…if I had large numbers (of shares)…then it would have a bigger effect, but I mean I am 
well motivated anyway, so I don’t feel that it has added to that. (SIP Participant, Company 
1).   
Gifts and feeling ‘special’ 
We have already noted that Company 4 selected people to be offered the chance to participate in 
its EMI scheme. The earlier quotes indicate that this was unexpected, perceived as a rather 
personal gift, and an endorsement of the person’s contribution to the company. Caramelli (2011) 
emphasized the importance of providing employees with a clear message regarding how 
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management value employees, and Company 4’s approach seemed to do this at least for the chosen 
few: 
 
...it (the offer to participate in the EMI) was a sign of recognition of effort, from the Chief 
Exec, and the higher level management team, that here is a guy that we want to entice, that 
he does make a difference, yeah, we will try to motivate him to stay with the company and 
not go off and do something else. (EMI Participant, Company 4). 
  
The SIP scheme also permits the giving of shares by the employer but because SIP has to 
be offered to all employees, the ‘gift’ is less personal and the message about being valued is less 
clear. Company 1 offered free shares and employees did not have to (in fact, could not) buy any.  
This was appreciated as a gift but employees reported feeling motivated by working for an 
environmentally friendly approach to business and this seemed to minimise the felt impact of SIP. 
It also provided more evidence of the role of pre-existing attitudes:  
 
I just thought, yes, that [the SIP] is quite a nice thing to do, but I don’t feel more loyal than 
I did, because I am anyway. Everyone that works here, works here because they share in the 
ethical values… (SIP Participant, Company 1).   
 
Bryson and Freeman (2012, p. 7) argue that, if share plan participation is part of a gift 
exchange, plan members will reciprocate with additional effort. This additional effort however, is 
not predicted if participants are simply trying to make a financial return. We find little support for 
the ‘gift-exchange’ theory. Some participants, especially in companies 1 and 4, interpreted ESO 
as a gift or positive gesture, but they explained very little in terms of ‘exchange’. It would be 
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difficult to infer from employees’ descriptions in this study that being selected or given free shares 
led to any significant changes in individual or firm performance. 
In the EMI scheme, the (unexpected) awards were based on past performance, for which 
recipients had already been recognised and rewarded. Their expectations had therefore already 
been met or exceeded. This may have reduced the motivational effect, especially as most 
employees did not see a clear link between their own individual performance and share price, and 
the plan was seen as ‘long term’. However, the EMI was the only scheme to have virtually any 
reported effect on feeling trusted, feeling valued, feeling a sense of responsibility or work 
performance. Even for EMI, no more than a quarter of respondents reported any such effects. In 
the SIP, again, the matching and free shares were perceived more as a result of their work, rather 
than an incentive to work harder.  
Despite the general lack of perceived effect of ESO on most work attitudes and performance, 
some respondents who perceived the offer to participate or the matching or free shares as a gift, 
and felt ‘special’, tended to draw a contrast between being ‘just’ an employee and being an ESO 
participant. This has already been illustrated in the first quote in the findings section. What exactly 
ESO participation turned a person into was less clear, but despite this, it does rather suggest that 
ESO was perceived to have some effect in how employees viewed themselves at work: 
  
……Quite often you do feel like a shareholder because…. (pause) you have a stake in the 
company, you have a voice, you’re not just an employee. (SAYE participant, Company 7).    
 
So yeah, because of being part of the scheme I do feel I am part of the company rather than 
just an employee. (EMI participant, Company 4). 
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These quotes suggest that ESO feeds into, or possibly induces, a separation in people’s 
minds between being an employee and being, in some sense, part of things. This seemed to be an 
intra-personal phenomenon, since none of the interviewees indicated that they viewed their non-
ESO colleagues as second class citizens. The fact that two participants from company 4’s EMI 
scheme drew the contrast between employee and shareholder is perhaps because they were 
selected by senior management to receive the share options (see Appendix 2) and therefore may 
have had particular reason to feel ‘part of things’.    
 
Discussion  
In this study we have presented a methodological contrast to previous studies (e.g. Pendleton, 
2010), drawn on theories of the impact of ESO (such as Klein’s instrumental, intrinsic satisfaction 
and extrinsic satisfaction models), and examined how employees perceive and explain the effects 
of ESO. We find the explanations and themes align with expectancy theory, particularly its 
expectancy and instrumentality components. In the majority of cases, participants did not feel they 
could influence the performance of the company or share price. Few employees felt that the ESO 
scheme could, or would, lead them to work harder. As discussed, it is possible that better 
performing firms are more likely to introduce ESO schemes, which (if correct) would suggest that 
relatively higher performing employees (who may also feel that cannot work any harder) are more 
likely to be offered opportunities to participate in ESO than employees in companies performing 
less well. This, and the lack of impact found on employee performance, assists in explaining why 
Richter and Schrader (2016) found that employee performance (sales per employee) was not 
enhanced drastically by ESO, yet ESO firms outperformed non-ESO firms.  
We elicit from the data that most employees felt that until their shares or options needed to 
be checked (e.g. at the end of the savings period in the SAYE) they could be forgotten about. 
Employees felt they had little or no influence over the financial return. ESO participation was nice 
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to have and the possibility of making a financial return encouraged about half the respondents to 
report that they would stay with their employer and wait for it. However, respondents indicated 
that ESO participation did not on the whole significantly change what they thought, felt, or did 
whilst at work. ESO was a good thing primarily because they might make money from it, though 
by no means everyone thought that they would. The possibility that their affective commitment, 
motivation or performance at work would be influenced by participation in an ESO scheme 
seemed implausible to most employees. Of Klein’s (1987) three models, our findings therefore 
most closely reflect the extrinsic model that ownership leads to behavioural change because it is 
financially rewarding. However, this is only observable for intention to stay with the company.  
In studies where an impact has been found on firm performance, this may be due in part to 
ESO’s ‘golden handcuffs’ (Sengupta, Whitfield and McNabb, 2007) influence on employees. 
ESO provides an increased incentive to stay, leading to knock-on effects which may produce 
greater efficiencies (e.g. lower hiring/firing costs) without employees feeling they themselves are 
working any harder or better because of ESO. Given the relatively high number of participants 
who reported an effect of ESO on the amount of time they would stay employed in the company, 
these potential efficiencies may have applied to the companies in this study. 
ESO managers had mixed and on the whole rather unelaborated views of what ESO might 
achieve, but they usually included financial gain for employees and retaining them for the 
company, often (but not always) with additional propositions about motivation, satisfaction and 
reinforcing company culture (see Appendix 2). Our findings suggest that ESO managers, as well 
as politicians and corporate leaders, would be well advised to be circumspect about the benefits 
of ESO they highlight when trying to promote participation in the scheme. Since the 1980s, a key 
policy objective of UK governments has been to enhance, and widen the use of ESO (Pendleton, 
2001). This study raises the question of whether participants in ESO believe that it achieves what 
it is claimed to achieve. 
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This generally negative conclusion needs to be tempered a little, however. About a quarter 
of respondents thought their affective commitment had been affected by ESO, and a sixth reported 
the same for motivation. Also, even though most respondents who reported effects on their 
commitment and motivation thought these were small and/or uncertain, nobody said that their 
commitment, motivation or any other attitude had been reduced by ESO. Further, some 
respondents felt, in a diffuse way, more ‘part of things’ and somehow different from when they 
were a run of the mill employee. Experientially, then, and in contrast to some motivation theory 
(Deci and Ryan, 1980), the dominant extrinsic narrative around the benefits of ESO did not 
eliminate the more intrinsic outcomes, though we cannot rule out the possibility that it reduced 
them. This also suggests that previous ESO literature (e.g. Pierce et al., 1991; Bryson and 
Freeman, 2012) may have over-drawn the contrast between financial and intrinsic orientations.  
Our participants’ responses offer some insights that can inform future theory and research. 
At least in the context of these three UK schemes, there is no evidence that ESO was seen as part 
of a set of participative company practices that involved employees in company decision-making. 
Proponents of participation explanations of ESO might therefore argue that it is not surprising that 
employees thought ESO had few effects (Freeman, Blasi and Kruse, 2010). On the other hand, 
there was also no evidence that our respondents expected ESO to be part of a bigger set of 
participation practices. Therefore accounts of ESO that major on participation may not be 
reflecting employees’ lived experience of ESO, at least in the UK context. 
We found little evidence that respondents construed ESO as a gift, except perhaps in 
Company 4 where they were selected for participation on the basis of their contribution to the 
company. It seems that feeling special is what mattered – a gift that was given to everyone was a 
company policy, not a present. More important, perhaps, participants were resistant to the idea 
that ESO, gift or not, could induce responses of more motivation, commitment and (particularly) 
performance. They frequently argued that they were already doing all they could in these respects, 
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and not to do so would be unprofessional. Again, this suggests that caution is needed in the way 
ESO is sold to potential participants. From a research point of view, it emphasizes the value of 
taking pre-existing attitudes and behaviours into account when evaluating the impact of ESO. As 
we indicated earlier, we do not claim that employees’ reports necessarily reflect causal processes 
(c.f. Illes, 2006). Also, our respondents could not be sure how they would be feeling and acting at 
present if they were not ESO participants, though some could and did compare with themselves 
at a time in the past when they were not ESO participants.   
Finally, we return to the financial and tenure elements of ESO. Although half our 
respondents said that the ESO scheme would increase their tenure via its financial returns, half 
did not. This was for several reasons. Employees did not always anticipate that their participation 
in an ESO scheme would make money, and indeed some thought they could lose out if share 
prices did not recover. So this is not a sure-fire way of ensuring that employees intend to stay with 
the company. Also, respondents felt that the long-term nature of some of the schemes meant that 
the pay-off was too much in the background and too uncertain to influence their behaviour. Thus, 
although longer-term schemes may seem likely to maximise the retention effect of ESO, they may 
instead have the opposite effect. Employees perceived that they had little influence on company 
performance, and even less on company share price, so in their eyes they could not influence their 
financial return from ESO. Although we did not directly ask about it, no interviewee mentioned 
trying to influence the effort and performance of those around them, in contrast to the suggestion 
made by Freeman, Kruse and Blasi (2010). Given our other results, this means that if employees 
think there will be little or no financial benefit of participation in ESO, there are no obvious 
alternative positive outcomes that can compensate.                   
 
Limitations    
36 
 
The ESO schemes in this study were operating in a less than favourable environment, with falling 
share prices and in some cases the share price being lower than the value of the discounted share 
option. The uncertainty and risk may therefore have affected ESO’s capacity to influence 
employees. Nevertheless, interviewees were asked to reflect on their experiences of ESO over the 
years employed in the company, and many had experiences of ESO well before the recession. It 
is also possible that some employees were selected by managers because the manager felt they 
were relatively motivated or hard working, and would provide a good example of ESO’s positive 
impact. Managers may have believed ESO had caused these positive attitudes and behaviours, 
whereas, it may instead be that motivated and harder working employees are more likely to join 
the scheme. Nevertheless, the findings reiterate the importance of taking pre-existing attitudes and 
behaviours into account when offering ESO schemes to employees, and when evaluating ESO’s 
impact. 
Qualitative research is sometimes accused of relying too much on the researcher’s views 
about what is significant and important (Bryman, 2004). The researchers are the main instrument 
of data collection and so what is heard and what the researchers decide to concentrate on is, to 
some extent, a product of their predilections and own interpretations. To help overcome this, 
employees were able (and often asked) to discuss, clarify, explain and elaborate, in order to help 
the interviewer as much as possible see the world through the interviewees’ eyes. The researchers 
take the position in this study that the interviewees attempted to provide explanations which they 
felt, at that time, were important and in their minds ‘true’.  
 
Conclusions and future research    
In summary, the findings suggest that paying specific attention to how ESO schemes can be used 
as a way of communicating to employees how important and valued they are to the company, 
whilst giving a clear indication of how employees can make money from the scheme in a way that 
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meets their expectations, could help lead to a deeper understanding of ESO’s positive attitudinal 
changes. Whether all-employee schemes and schemes with no free share element have any 
potential to achieve attitudinal change, particularly in cases where employees do not feel that the 
scheme will lead to financial gain, may also be a worthwhile area for future research. The EMI 
was the only scheme to have virtually any reported effect on feeling trusted, feeling valued, feeling 
a sense of responsibility and work performance. Like the EMI Scheme, Incentive Stock Option 
Plans in the US are also discretionary, and as with the SIP, shares can be donated to employees in 
the ESOP in the US. The discretionary and free share elements of these plans could be examined 
further to ascertain the transferability of our findings to similar schemes in different contexts and 
cultures. Further exploration, possibly in combination with a study of innovative methods 
companies are increasingly using (e.g. text messaging, games, audio CDs) to inform and alert 
employees to ESO, might help uncover more detail about how employees think about ESO. 
Finally, it may be of interest to policy makers and researchers to consider more closely whether 
the employees who stay longer because of ESO are those the organization would most like to 
retain, and the nature of any multiplier effects resulting from this.  
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Table 1: Sample criteria and characteristics of the chosen companies and employees 
 
 Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 Company 5 Company 6 Company 7 Company 8 Company 9 
Company Details 
ESO scheme SIP SIP SIP EMI EMI EMI SAYE SAYE SAYE 
Year ESO 
Scheme 
Introduced 
 
2008 
 
2007 
 
2003 
 
2008 
 
2004 
 
2007 
 
1985 
 
1981 
 
1985 
Industry Real Estate Market Research 
Biology/ 
Consumer 
Care 
Care Service 
Neuro-
scientific 
Research 
Management 
Consultancy Tele-comms Retail 
Financial 
Services 
Number of 
Employees 42 850 3500 850 22 11 105,000 75,000 204,200 
ESO scheme(s) 
in place SIP SIP SIP & SAYE 
EMI & 
SAYE EMI EMI SIP & SAYE SAYE SIP & SAYE 
Age of Business 
(yrs) 10 - 15 15 - 20 15 - 20 1 - 5 5 - 10 1 - 5 20+ 20+ 20+ 
Employees Interviewed 
Male 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 1 2 
Female 2 2 3 1 2 1 0 3 3 
Year of Interview 
2009 0 4 0 4 4 4 4 0 5 
2010 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Length of Employment (yrs) 
Up to 3 1 1 1 0 3 3 1 0 0 
More than 3 and 
up to 10 
3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 
More than 10 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 4 4 
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Table 1 (Continued):  
 
Length of time participating in ESO Scheme (yrs) 
1 year or less 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 
More than 1 
year and up to 3 
years 
4 4 2 
 
0 2 3 1 
 
0 
 
0 
More than 3 
years and up to 
5 years 
0 0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
More than 5 
years and up to 
10 years 
0 0 1 
 
0 0 
 
0 2 0 3 
More than 10 
years and up to 
20 years 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 0 2 2 
More than 20 
years 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 
Gross Earnings (£) 
Up to 24,999 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 2 0 
25,000 - 54,999 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 
55,000+ 0 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 2 
Financial 
Investment of 
each person1 
1,133 
Unknown  
Unknown 
1500 
4880 
Unknown 
2000 
3000 
Unknown 
10,000 
2,303 
1,500 
< 30,000 
30,000-
50,000 x2 
Unknown 
< 30,000 x2 
Unknown x2 
< 30,000 
Unknown x3 
225 x3 
108 
 
15 
250 
30 
150 
250 x3 
200 
100 
 
 1  For SIP and EMI this is value of shares or options held. For SAYE it is amount saved per month. Unknown means the interviewee didn’t know.
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Appendix 1  
 
SIP, EMI and SAYE Schemes 
 
SIP SIP participants become shareholders as soon as they participate. The SIP has three key 
elements: employers can give employees up to £3,000 worth of free shares each year; 
employees can buy up to £1,500 of ‘partnership shares’; and employers can give 
participants up to two free shares for every partnership share bought (matching shares). 
Performance conditions can also be attached to the award of SIP shares. 
EMI EMI share options are intended to help smaller, higher risk companies. Employees can 
be selected and granted options (at a fixed exercise price) over shares worth up to 
£120,000 at date of grant. Once granted EMI options, participants are required to wait 
until three years after the last of these options was granted before any more options can 
be granted. Options can be granted at any exercise price.  
SAYE In SAYE, employees can be given the right (option) to buy shares in the company and 
sell (exercise) the shares at a price, which is fixed when the option is granted. Between 
£5 and £250 per month can be saved in an SAYE savings contract. This can last for 
three, five or seven years. The savings made during this period can be used to buy the 
shares if the employee chooses to exercise their options. Alternatively, participants can 
receive the proceeds of the SAYE contract (savings).  
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Appendix 2  
 
Additional contextual information about each participating company 
 
Company 1 
SIP  
Real Estate 
Uses free share offers only, not partnership or matching share offers. Number of shares 
depends on company performance, tenure, status and hours worked.  Tax advantages to 
keeping the shares for three years. Shares surrendered on dismissal or voluntary 
turnover. Scheme introduced partly to protect company mission. ESO manager expects 
a modest incremental effect on tenure, motivation and “feeling part” of the company 
but worries that shareholdings may be too small to achieve that.   
Company 2 
SIP  
Market 
Research 
Uses partnership and matching shares, not free shares. For every 17 shares an employee 
buys, the company gives three. These are not subject to performance conditions. There 
are tax incentives to keep the shares for five years. Voluntary leavers can sell their 
shares (though subject to taxes). ESO manager said the scheme was introduced because 
it would be well-received and encourage people to be “emotionally and financially tied 
to the company.”  
Company 3 
SIP 
Biology/ 
Consumer 
Care 
Uses partnership and matching shares, not free shares. After one year in the company 
employees can use up to £125 per month to buy shares at the market rate, which are 
then matched by free shares from the company. No performance conditions. Sale of 
shares before three years means loss of matching shares and tax liability. Between 3 
and 5 years, tax only, no loss of matching shares. ESO manager said “staff retention, 
that’s the main point”, via financial incentives and reinforcing family business ethos. 
Company 4 
EMI 
Care Service 
EMI scheme is limited to those defined by senior management as key employees; about 
11% of the total at the time of data collection. There was no formal definition of a key 
employee. ESO manager indicated that those offered shares would interpret it as 
signalling their value to the company. Shares are allocated after about three years. They 
do not give voting rights.   
Company 5 
EMI 
Neuro-
scientific 
Research 
Employees joining the scheme are, over 3 years, allocated the same number of share 
options as their salary in UK pounds. However, whether they receive all of these 
depends on their performance.  Employees have three years to exercise the shares. 
Voluntarily leaving the company leads to loss of the options they have been granted.  
ESO manager thought ESO was to “lead employees to feel some form of ownership”, 
which produced financial gain through individual and company performance. 
Company 6 
EMI 
Management 
Consultancy 
Options are typically granted once a year for non-voting equity, equating to 2% of the 
business. The amount received by each participating employee depends on their salary 
and bonus.  Options can be exercised ten years after the grant, or when the company is 
sold. The company founders wanted to spread wealth, not dilute control. 
Company 7 
SAYE 
Telecoms 
The scheme has been running for more than 25 years. Employees can participate in 
three year or five year contracts. About 55% of the workforce participates. Options do 
not give voting rights. The employee has to exercise the options and become a 
shareholder for that. ESO manager thought that scheme was seen as a key benefit that 
affected satisfaction, motivation, knowledge of the stock market and enabled 
employees to accumulate extra wealth.   
Company 8 
SAYE 
Retail 
Has previously used SIP. Three year contracts are offered to employees. Voting rights 
work as in company 7. ESO manager said the scheme was to encourage employees to 
“feel part of the business”, and was also an aspect of corporate social responsibility, 
enabling employees to plan for a financially secure future.  
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Company 9 
SAYE 
Financial 
Services 
The scheme has been running for more than 25 years. Employees are offered 3, 5 or 7 
year contracts. Voting rights as in companies 7 and 8. About 79% of the workforce 
participates. ESO manager said the scheme was introduced primarily to enable 
employees to make extra money, but a crash in the share price had made this an 
unlikely outcome in recent years. 
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